In his 1955 article ‘The Question of Eternal Memory’, Tadeusz Hołuj, a Polish publicist, writer, and former inmate of the Auschwitz I concentration camp, stated that: ‘It has finally been understood that Auschwitz does not require any “framing”.’ More an expression of premature optimism or wishful thinking than an accurate assessment of the actual politics of memory exercised at Auschwitz-Birkenau after 1954, Hołuj’s statement functioned both as a critique of the ideological instrumentalization of the camps and as an attempt to redefine the meaning of the sites in terms of their self-referentiality. Former camps, seen above all as forensic evidence or material witnesses to crimes committed during World War II, were to be conceived as authentic traces of the problematic past, and not as socially constructed and culturally contested forms of its reworking and representation; that is, as media of collective or cultural memory, which, in fact, they always are. Naive as it might seem today, back in 1955, Hołuj’s postulate to conceive of ‘Auschwitz’ as self-obvious and self-referential was above all a political statement. Directed against the vulgar political framing of the
memorial landscape in the form of ‘Stalinization’, the sentence was an expression of the desire, shared by many former inmates of Auschwitz-Birkenau, to de-Stalinize and thus not to de-frame, but to reframe the camp; in other words, to reclaim it.2

The ostensible transparency of the politics of memory introduced at the memorial site in 1954, with its emphasis on the authenticity of the remains of the camps, the lack of plaques or suggestive descriptions, and the collection of historical documents and preservation of evidence, in fact constituted a strong and persistent interpretive framework in itself — one which continues to influence perceptions of the sites of former NS camps in Poland until this day. Thus, the ‘pathos of authenticity’, a seemingly neutral and a-political politics of commemoration described by James E. Young as the ‘rhetoric of ruins’,3 can readily be listed among other commemorative idioms exercised at and about the sites of former concentration and extermination camps in Poland. The list of these idioms, constantly updated and broadened by scholars such as Young, Jonathan Webber, Jonathan Huener, Michael Steinlauf, or Zofia Wóycicka, not only reflects transformations in the general political climate and in official, highly politicised interpretations of the war experience in post-war communist Poland, it also points to the constantly changing strategies of spatial and architectural reworking of those sites — of the former camps — designated to function as its most powerful symbol.

Thus, in line with the Polonization, de-Judeization or internationalization4 of official interpretations of the camps, the content of commemorative plaques changed, and newly erected monuments mirrored dominant commemorative frames. Directly after the war the camps were to be viewed as sites of martyrrology and victimhood. Accordingly, the aim was to ‘realistically’ transmit the monstrous experiences of the camps by using dummies to ‘re-enact’ scenes of camp life, and by engaging former inmates as guides.5 In order to reinforce the image of the camps as loci of Polish ‘sacrificial patriotism’,6 they were decorated with crosses and eternally burning flames. In the 1950s and — after a short ‘transparency break’ — 1960s, the camps were interpreted as sites of heroism, resistance and class struggle against fascism and imperialism. It is not surprising then that the monuments and ‘artistic projects of the 1960s often combined in them totalitarian monumentalism with representational expressionism’,7 the dominant aesthetics of communist regime. Pope John Paul II’s visit to Auschwitz-Birkenau in 1979 transformed the camp into the ‘Golgotha of the Polish nation’,8 and, at the same time, into a site of redemption and a symbol of a general protest against the war (also bringing about a return of the crosses).

The identification of these idioms of cultural memory has exposed the political and ideological entanglements of commemorative strategies at the sites of former camps in post-war, communist Poland. Yet, while considerable attention has been paid by scholars to the problems of preservation and representation, and their connection with political and ideological uses of the sites of former concentration camps before 1989, little reflection has been devoted as yet to the cultural narrations and political discourses which are today part of the process of the social and cultural production of these sites. Paradoxically, it seems that after 1989 it was again ‘finally understood that Auschwitz does not require any framing’: dialogue and reconciliation at last replaced vulgar political framing, and the truthfulness and accuracy of the information provided by plaques and inscriptions replaced the politics of ‘white spots’ and concealment. This apparently new, post-political, condition is reflected both in newly emerging commemorative idioms and following, concentrated mostly on aesthetic dimension, conceptualizations of the strategies of Holocaust and Second World War commemoration undertaken at the sites of former National Socialist camps.9

In an attempt to identify and analyze these emerging idioms, I will concentrate on two sites
that for many years were almost absent in Polish memory discourse,\textsuperscript{10} and which can nowadays be regarded as potentially the most modern and most contemporary (and therefore most representative) of Polish Holocaust memorials. I am referring to the only memorial landscapes built after 1989: the memorial of the former NS extermination camp in Bełżec, erected in 2004, and the commemorative project for the extermination camp in Sobibór, introduced by its former museum director Marek Bem in 2006.\textsuperscript{11} (This spring the memorial site in Sobibór became, like Bełżec Memorial a few years earlier, part of Majdanek Memorial Museum. The project described and analyzed in this paper will most probably not be completed due to this fact.)

The extermination camp in Bełżec was erected in February 1942 and destroyed in Spring 1943. Approximately 500 000 people were killed there, mainly Polish Jews; only three people survived. Sobibór started operating in March 1942, one month later than at Bełżec, and was pulled down in October 1943 after the uprising and mass escape of the inmates from the camp. The estimated number of Sobibór victims is 250 000. After the introduction of Aktion 1005 in 1942 the corpses of the victims — as at other camps in Poland and Eastern Europe — were exhumed and burned. The main objective of the Sonderaktion was to erase every trace of the crimes that were committed in the camps. After the camps ceased to operate, gas chambers and barracks were dismantled, and a pine forest was planted by the retreating SS. Their attempts to erase all signs of the camp were largely successful: apart from the remains of the ramp at Sobibór and two buildings at Bełżec, there are no material remains left. The camps were ‘literally emptied, and metaphorically voided’\textsuperscript{12} not only as a result of a Nazi politics of trace erasure, however, but also because of post-war devastation resulting from so-called ‘treasure hunting’ — the digging up of the extermination camps’ grounds by the local Polish population, in search of gold teeth and other valuables. The apparently natural, but in fact constructed and artificial, landscape of pine forest planted on the sites, and the dug up ‘earth that [was] as unsteady as the sea’,\textsuperscript{13} to quote Vasilii Grossman, was all that remained.

This lack of material vestiges, which might have served as media of self-referential memory, only supported the constant and active efforts at a cultural forgetting of Bełżec and Sobibór that was inscribed in Polish post-war official memory work: both extermination camps, for many years nonexistent on the symbolic maps of Holocaust memory, were first commemorated in the 1960s (Bełżec in 1963, Sobibór in 1965), right before the outbreak of the anti-Zionist campaign in 1968. The fact that death camps where no ethnic Poles died could not be easily inscribed in official post-war memory had an immediate effect on the character of their commemoration. Their status as ‘sites of oblivion’,\textsuperscript{14} located outside the realm of public grievability, was confirmed. The years directly after the transition in 1989 did not bring about any major change. The inscriptions on the deteriorating monuments in Bełżec and Sobibór, which gave false information about the number of victims and their national or ethnic affiliation, were taken down and replaced. In both cases, the camps have only very recently become objects of archeological research, gaining legitimate status as forms of forensic evidence in 1997 (Bełżec) and 2000 (Sobibór).

Yet, the discussion launched by the publication of Jan Tomasz Gross’s controversial book on Jedwabne in 2000, and on the post-war plunder of Treblinka and other sites of former extermination camps (Golden Harvest) in 2010, radically transformed the Polish imagery and cultural memory of extermination camps, providing an incentive to rethink not only the history of the memory of the camps, but also the problem of Polish-Jewish relations before, during and after the World War II — a subject that was almost absent in public discourse at that
time. As subjects of historical research, the sites were transformed into contested landscapes: a prism through which one could analyze and question firmly established convictions about Polish victimhood during the war, and about Polish pre-war and post-war anti-Semitism. As a consequence, they gained the power to contribute (at least potentially) to an already abundant ‘Polish hauntology’ in new, problematizing ways. Jews, as ghosted or spectralized citizens of Poland — marginalized and rendered invisible by means of exclusion from the national community during and after the war — returned to haunt Polish national identity formation and exclusive memory politics.

Paradoxically, the erasure of pre-1989 signs of Polish official memory work, problematic as it may have been, was the first, again emptying, gesture of the authors of the projects for both Bełżec and Sobibór. The effort to commemorate those places ‘that do not exist’ transformed the sites themselves (that is the pine forests and meadows growing on the human remains) into museum artifacts. The protection of the terrain of the former camps and mass graves, preceded by archeological research, much apart from the effort to commemorate the victims, was conceived as one of the main objectives of the proposed architectural project of the memorial sites. The explicitly articulated aim was to transform Bełżec and Sobibór into sites of the commemoration of death; since destruction was a part of their history, the camps were not rebuilt but transformed into cemeteries or ‘cemetry memorials’.

The symbolic and spatial framing of the mass graves functions as a central element of the still unrealized Sobibór project. A paved yard, created by clearing the ‘artificial’ forest planted by the SS, is designed to reconstruct the irregular contours of the seven mass graves discovered during archeological research. ‘Finding the mass graves allows for the transformation of these holes in the ground into a real cemetery’, one can read in the project’s description. The graves, still containing the ashes of the victims of the camp, are not directly accessible to the visitors and are surrounded by a ferroconcrete barrier, to be covered with sand and grass — probably a reference to the history of the concealment of the traces of the camp. In an interesting compromise between the rabbinical prohibition against disturbing or removing graves and the Catholic function of a cemetery as a place for contemplation, the design will separate the yard — and the
graves — from the rest of the memorial complex.

The core elements of memorial landscape include: the museum or a ‘remembrance centre’, a traveling exhibition entitled ‘From the Ashes of Sobibór’, an educational path, and a Himmelfahrtsstrasse. Unlike the multimedia and interactive exhibition based on survivors’ accounts, the main aim of which is to generate empathy and identification with the victims’ experience, the Himmelfahrtsstrasse, the death road in the camp, is not accessible to visitors. Visible, framed, but closed, the death road seems on the one hand to thematize the experience of the victims of the camps. On the other hand, it also and at the same time points to the fact that there are limits to visitors’ identification with victims, a lack of access to what was experienced there. Thus, the ‘Road to Heaven’, while framing absence — that is, the empty road — itself functions as a very meaningful memorial. The interesting and, in my opinion, very important reversal of a perspective dominant in other Holocaust memorial landscapes — where gas chambers and crematories are visited by tourists — very effectively triggers and emphasizes the need for memory work (which is, after all, always based on distance and a bar to access).

The strategy of commemoration applied in Bełżec approaches the problem of creating the graveyard differently. The authors of the project state that:

Our main task was to find the form of the Cemetery for this place that would appropriately honour and venerate the Jews murdered here according to the tradition, culture and religion in which they and their ancestors lived. Our architectural-sculptural concept covers the entire area of the former death camp. The most important element of the composition is the space of the symbolic mass grave containing authentic mass gravesites within its borders.19

Nevertheless, the main objective of the three Polish sculptors responsible for the project (Andrzej Sołyga, Zdzisław Pidek, Marchin Roszczyk) was not only protection of the 33 mass graves discovered by archeologists, but also a symbolic representation of the camp itself.

The beautiful architectural landscape of the site is separated from the surrounding area by a concrete wall. After passing through the entrance gate, visitors find themselves on a symbolic ramp, framed by the
museum building (a sealed train) on one side, and by a pile of rails on the other (representing a funeral pyre on which the corpses of gassed victims were burnt). In front of the ramp there is a burial ground: a raised terrain covered with clinker, ash, and sterilized earth, which is supposed to symbolize death.

The burial ground itself is fenced in by a cast-iron border; like the fragments of the yard at Sobibór, it cannot be trespassed. The entrance to the burial ground features another important element of the architectural project: a symbolic point of crossing into the cemetery, it is marked by a horizontal sculptural composition covered with a relief depicting deconstructed star of David, which is defined as an emblem of the camp itself.

Fragments of the fenced land, covered with darkened slag and untouched, in accordance with Jewish tradition, mark the mass graves. The interstice or ‘the way’, a tunnel leading through the graveyard, is the only part of the cemetery accessible to the visitors, and is the only part of the camp free from human remains; most likely, it is also the camp’s death road.

The interstice leads visitors to the Niche, the walls of which are covered with names of the victims, and the ‘stone wall’, which bears an inscription from the book of Job: ‘Earth, do not cover my blood; let there be no resting place for my outcry.’ The experience of crossing the tunnel between the graves and confronting a stone wall at the end of the road is a very suggestive one, but rather more affective than haptic. It reminds one naturally of the experience of walking through Eisenman’s Holocaust Memorial in Berlin. Yet, the interplay between the experience of the victims who were forced to cross the road and the experience of the visitor, inaugurated by the architectural form of the Bełżec’s memorial, has a denouement which Eisenman’s project lacks. The experience of distance, restored on entering the Niche and finding a way out, aims, just like the Road to Heaven in Sobibór, at problematizing the visitors’ identification with the victims of the camp. Thus the architectural form refers not only to the lack of access, but also to the surplus of meaning that is to be (or rather cannot be) experienced there.

An effort to draw a clear line of demarcation separating the realm of the living from the realm of the dead, inscribed in both analyzed projects, is obviously strictly connected with a recognition of the sites of the former camps as cemeteries, which they are even without any architectural intervention. According to Jewish tradition, the fact that the earth in Bełżec and Sobibór is covered with ashes and human remains itself transforms the camps — also in an absence of tombstones — into cemeteries. Therefore, the act of creating the memorial complex ought to be interpreted as a more or less symbolic reburial. The transition of the ‘real cemetery’ into a ‘cemetery memorial’ expresses the need to give the victims a proper burial at a site where, to quote Robert Kuwalek, ‘Jewish ritual is more important than the curiosity of the visitors’. Yet reburial, which, according to Katherine Verdery, always aims at redefining the relations between the living and the dead, is also an act of morally and politically charged reinterpretation, especially in the case of the victims of genocide and mass extermination. Hence, even if a memorial’s basic function is
said to be paying respect to the dead, the answer to the questions of how and why this respect is paid is critical.

The use of the sacred-secular opposition as a main interpretive framework seems to be crucial for the new commemorative idiom exercised at Bełżec and Sobibór. The insistence on intentionally problematised identification, blocked by the fences, walls, iron borders and inaccessible areas, and strengthened by the sacralisation of the burial grounds, is constantly at work at both memorial sites. In (at least partial) accordance with the postulate formulated by Andreas Huyssen, to always ‘keep Holocaust monuments and memorials site-specific’, both projects abandon ‘traditional’ strategies of Holocaust commemoration as applied in other memorial sites in Poland. They reject the ‘real death’ idiom described by Anna Ziępinska-Witek, which is based on the assumption that the site’s authenticity and the presence of the authentic objects should provide the visitor with an insight into the ‘real’, monstrous experiences of the victims. At Bełżec and Sobibór, ‘real death’ is replaced by a more symbolic and less earthly idea of death: transcendentized and sanctified by the sacrifice of life.

At Sobibór, the terrain of the cemetery is separated from the rest of the memorial site — the elements such as the remembrance centre and the avenue of remembrance — and thus functions as a crucial but autonomous part of the memorial complex. The distinction between sites of prayer or mourning and sites of remembrance is, therefore, clearly suggested by the spatial organization of the memorial landscape. The sacralization of the space is accomplished thanks to the quotation of the Kaddish, which is to be inscribed on the pillars located next to the seven mass graves, and by the above-mentioned separation. The cemetery is the last stop in the visitor’s journey through the memorial site, adding a rather redemptive significance to the tour’s culmination. At Bełżec the architectural framing of the camp, of the process of mass killing, and of the cemetery overlap, providing an almost unambiguous interpretative frame. The authors of the site lead the visitor from the ramp to the literal and symbolic point of the crossing into the cemetery. The relief that adorns this crossing provides, according to the project’s designers, ‘proof of the abstraction and absurdity of the reasons for this drama’. After entering the burial ground one is surrounded by ‘the soil that became sacred thanks to the blood of the victims’, and then lead straight to the Niche — the place where the radical hiatus separating the absurdity and cruelty of life and the sanctity of death can be contemplated. Not only a redemptive closure, but also the feeling of relief — ‘the return to the normal life’, as Stephanie Endlich suggests — is inscribed into the experience of Bełżec cemetery memorial. This is not surprising: closure functions as constitutive element of almost every funeral ceremony and burial.

Thus the strategy of commemorative reburial applied in Bełżec and Sobibór transforms the ‘real cemeteries’, planted by the Nazis, then devastated, and dug up by the local population, and for so many years neglected, into seemingly politically and ideologically neutral, sacralized memorials. The ‘earth unsteady as the sea’, to quote Grossman again, is stabilized and reframed, meaning is granted, the murdered are honored and venerated. Nevertheless, the lack of reference to previous strategies of commemoration, or to the public and political debates surrounding the events that took place in Bełżec and Sobibór during and after the war, or its Polish-Jewish aspect, radically separates the experience of the sites from the context of their social and cultural afterlife.

It is exactly this paradoxical decontextualization, which could also be treated as an integral element of the reburial commemorative idiom, that I find particularly interesting and,
at the same time, problematic. The fact that commemorative reburial does not lead to a redefinition or even problematization of past and contemporary relations between the living (Poles) and the dead suggests that the memorial landscapes lack critical potential. Aestheticization and sacralization of death locates the Holocaust beyond or outside of the realm of historical and political arguments, crucial for Polish national self-determination — and maybe, in places like Belżec and Sobibór, it is better this way. Nevertheless, one is left with the impression that the dead (along with the critical potential of the reburial itself) were buried too thoroughly. Yet one glance at the ongoing, often very turbulent public debates on the topic — triggered lately by the release of the movie Pokłosie (Consequences) (2012; dir. Władysław Pasikowski) elaborating on the Jedwabne massacre, the publication of Beata Chomątowska’s Stacja Muranów (2012), a book about the Warsaw neighbourhood where the ghetto was located, still haunted by its Jewish inhabitants, and discussions surrounding the controversial idea to erect a monument for Polish Righteous Among the Nations directly next to the Museum of the History of the Polish Jews and the Ghetto Uprising Monument — allows one to deduce that the problem of Polish-Jewish relations still demands critical elaboration. In other words, to paraphrase Avery Gordon, we are dealing in Poland with ‘an ending that is not over yet’.27

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4 Huener, Auschwitz, Poland and the Politics of Commemoration, p. 44.
8 Huener, Auschwitz, Poland and the Politics of Commemoration, p. 213.
9 As an example one can list: Anna-Zielińska Witek, Historia w muzeach. Studium ekspozycji Holokaustu, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, Lublin 2011.
10 See: Robert Kuwałek, Obóz Zagłady w Bełżcu, Państwowe Muzeum na Majdanku, Lublin 2010; and Wóycicka, Przerwana żaloba.
12 Taborska, Polish Signs of Memory, p. 16.
14 See: Wóycicka, ‘Przerwana żaloba’.
16 Ziębinska-Witek, Historia w muzeach, p. 239.
17 Założenia pomnikowe na terenie byłego hitlerowskiego obozu zagłady w Bełżcu. Project of the Cemetery Memorial to the Jewish Victims of the Nazi Death Camp in Belzec, Rada Ochrony Pamięci Walk i Męczeństwa, The American Jewish Committee, Warszawa 2003.
18 Bem, Masterplan Sobibór, p. 3.
19 Założenia pomnikowe, p. 2.
24 Założenia pomnikowe, p. 10.
Detecting Memory Events

Rolf Fredheim

The Memory at War project introduced the concept of the memory event as a tool for analysing the dynamics of cultural memory. A memory event has been defined as ‘a rediscovery of the past that creates a rupture with its accepted cultural meaning’ (Etkind 2010). What are the conceptual challenges posed by this concept, and how might we go about applying it in our research? In this article I explore some of these questions via a brief case study of how the concept of the memory event might be operationalised as part of statistical models of the news cycle, drawing on the example of media representations of the August 1991 Putsch. More generally, this illustrates how clear criteria may help to counter researcher bias in the humanities.

The precise meaning and content of the term ‘memory event’ is hard to pin down. One reason for this is conceptual stretching. In some Memory at War publications, the memory event has been described as cyclical and relatively frequent:

‘Memory events repeat themselves in new, creative but recognizable forms, which circulate in cultural space and reverberate in time’. [They may be] ‘funerals, repasts, celebrations, revelations, historical debates, museum openings’ etc. (Blacker et al. forthcoming 2013)

But elsewhere memory events are apparently contrasted to the cyclical behaviour described above:

‘[memory events] are not standard ritual commemorations, anniversaries or holidays — memorial rites, in other words — whose significance and value lie in their repeatability and constancy. Such rites duplicate memories, whereas memory events generate new memories bearing the structural imprint of old ones’ (Etkind et al. 2012, p.12).

I present these examples not to suggest that the term ‘memory event’ is hopelessly flawed, but rather to point at the flexible way in which it has been operationalised. Both definitions above suffer from a lack of clear boundaries. In the latter minimalist view, the criterion used is explosiveness. But how does one measure the difference between an explosion and a quick-fire salvo? The inevitable temptation is to draw the line so as to include what the researcher wants to investigate, meaning that it is easier to use this stricter definition when discussing massive instances of memory conflict, such as the 70th anniversary of the Katyn massacre, but harder when analysing film or literature, for example. Just as the focus on explosiveness results in an elastic concept, the looser definition will from the outset accommodate virtually any memory artefact. What is the value of a concept to which there is no clear alternative?
While *Memory at War* is unclear about the typology of the memory event, the project is much clearer about what the event *does*. Etkind writes that memory ‘evolves in a series of explosive events and is in turn shaped by these events’, and that ‘memory events are simultaneously acts and products of memory’. The ‘memory event’ positions itself in relation to the historical event, and in so doing may alter the collective memory of the event. The solution, perhaps, is that we know a memory event when we see it. Some cyclical events may be of enormous import, while others may leave virtually no trace. Is it then more appropriate to classify memory events by the form they take, rather than by creating a typology of events that may be attributed memory event status?

In what follows I aim to pin down the memory event by shifting the focus from the event itself to its representation in media discourse. This allows a structured approach where the focus becomes the impact of the event, rather than the event itself. Etkind explicitly acknowledges the actors who stage events, whilst implicitly pointing to the means by which events have an effect. Individuals may initiate memory events which, though individual acts, ‘belong to the public sphere’. How events ‘generate secondary waves and aftershocks’ or ‘create a rupture with accepted cultural meaning’, is left imprecise. But clearly, for the events to enter a collective’s memory, they need to be spoken about, reported by word of mouth, over the internet, or in the mass media. The role of the media as a conduit is visualised in the model below:

![Diagram of memory event mediation](image)

The illustration highlights how a news story or event may enter collective memory by means of a series of memory events, organised by individuals and interest groups, and mediated by formal and informal media, such as television, newspapers, blogs, and social media.

Just as individuals seek to commemorate certain events, the media select which commemorations are worth reporting. In this regard the media play a crucial role in memory formation. More than that, the meaning of an event can only enter collective memory by some form of mediation. The model highlights a complex set of interactions: the original event is reported in the media. It is also experienced directly by a number of individuals or groups. Even though they remember the event, their perception of it is partly conditioned by the representations it received in media. At some point someone may decide the event is worthy of marking, either by a public commemoration, by an exhibition, featuring in a novel, etc: a memory event is staged.

This memory event may or may not be highlighted by media, and may alter the way the event is remembered. Those experiencing the event directly may respond, possibly in conjunction with their view of the media representation of it, to stage a second memory event. These events will remain in a comparative vacuum without some degree of reporting, by word of mouth, over the internet, or through mass media. For a memory event to gain significance to a larger collective, this reporting must be on a large scale, and the fact of the reporting will influence the positioning of subsequent memory events.

A crucial point here is that memory events do not directly alter collective memory, but the
representation of the event have this potential. Even in large-scale events such as national celebrations or movie screenings (e.g. of Wajda’s *Katyn*), individuals attribute personal significance to the event; it is only through reports, analyses, and interpretations of the event reaching a wide audience that the collective’s memory may be normalised and converge on an accepted simple meaning.

*Opening the grey box*

In the illustration above media is highlighted as a grey box. By drawing on a combination of digital newspaper archives and statistical modeling tools used to analyse big data, we can peek inside the grey box. Computer programmers talk about black and glass boxes, where one is fully closed and the other fully transparent. The notion of a grey box suggests we can impose a degree of order on the mass of information inside the box, without suggesting this gives us a perfect image of what is happening inside. The illustration below highlights ways in which we can slice up aggregated information to possibly give valuable insights into how memory events function:

Here the media portrayal of the August Putsch is illustrated in purely quantitative terms: the first graph shows the raw number of articles printed per month. The next graph highlights a seasonal component, where there is one strong spike every year — presumably in August as the event is remembered. The third line illustrates the observed trend: early in the 2000s the Putsch was rapidly disappearing from media representations, but this stabilised, and has possibly increased (the graph reaches 0 in 2012, but only because it runs out of data). The illustration is created using a crude algorithm tuned to a news or business cycle; consequently it fails to explain the three large spikes. These are caused by round-number celebrations or commemorations, and are a particular feature of the memory cycle. This leaves a number of smaller peaks, which may be the result of random noise, but the larger the remaining spike, the more likely a memory event (a book, exhibition, public speech) has taken place.

The terms memory event, rites of memory, and collective memory, may by usefully distinguished not by deciding in advance what types of memory practice might qualify for one or other signifier, but by contrasting observations to expectations. A constant presence of a topic reflects its significance within collective memory (where the event figures as a marker), predictable variation in patterns are the result of memory rites (e.g. an expected increase in references every five years, or every annual anniversary), while memory
events are likely behind unexplained rises at other times. This distinction is useful because we can estimate whether a spike in references is part of a pattern, due to random variation, or likely caused by a ‘memory event’. Focusing on the observed effects in discourse has the additional benefit that momentous events coinciding or sparked by predictable memorial rites are not excluded.

Let me illustrate this point with the example of Katyn and Kaczynski’s plane crash which coincided with the 70th anniversary of the massacre. This was an annual commemoration, and not the first time Polish dignitaries visited Katyn. But even before the crash this was becoming a major memory event because the Russian side intended to participate in the commemorations. The fact that prime ministers Tusk and Putin met at Katyn vastly increased the frequency with which Katyn was spoken about, especially in Russia, but also in Poland and worldwide. This then, even before the crash, was not the average memorial rite, but a critical juncture. And this would be immediately apparent by comparing the number of press articles about the 70th anniversary to previous round-year celebrations.

In order to illustrate the methods proposed on a concrete example, that of the failed August Putsch of 1991, I applied a simple ANOVA to predict the distribution of articles for the period January 2000 to April-March 2012. A sample of newspapers was selected and grouped according to political orientation. Because a memory event may be identified when the observed value is substantially higher than the predicted value a strict rule of what constitutes a substantial difference was used. The key is to accurately answer questions of this type ‘we predicted 10 articles, but found 15. Is this the result of random fluctuation?’ Social scientists usually use the mean and standard deviation to calculate a 95% confidence interval, based on which a yes or no answer to such questions may be given. This, however, would be inappropriate in this case: the data are grouped by number of observations per month by orientation for more than a decade. In sum, therefore, the number of comparisons undertaken is over 600. The 95% confidence interval simply means we would expect to see a false positive for 1 in 20 comparisons, which, for 600 tests, would result in 30 ‘significant’ findings. To account for this the Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) correction was used to adjust p-values according to the number of observations, resulting in conservative estimates and a reduced likelihood of false positives. Still stricter adjustments might be used (e.g. Bernoulli’s distribution), but for this type of analysis it is easier to subsequently expose false positives than false negatives (see below).

**Modeling memory events**

The plots below contain dense information about observed and predicted values, along with the ANOVA table used to make the predictions. On the one hand, the Analysis of Deviance shows that references to the August Putsch more closely follow a typical memory trajectory than a news-cycle, but this is of little interest in this case. More significantly, it demonstrates that the pro-Kremlin media have tended to lose interest in the Putsch, while the Communists and Liberals have become more interested. But most crucially for the discussion above it visualises the points at which memory events may have occurred: these are the ones where the observed values are furthest from those predicted by the ANOVA as indicated by a dotted line.
The plot and ANOVA table illustrate that the increased activity observed during anniversaries is entirely unremarkable. Accounting for this predictability, and adjusting values for the number of observations, yields the table below, indicating when memory events are most likely to have occurred:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>date</th>
<th>orientation</th>
<th>adj.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000-01-01</td>
<td>lib</td>
<td>0.0482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-08-01</td>
<td>com</td>
<td>0.00411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-09-01</td>
<td>cen</td>
<td>0.0481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-02-01</td>
<td>lib</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-08-01</td>
<td>cen</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-01-01</td>
<td>lib</td>
<td>0.04815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012-02-01</td>
<td>lib</td>
<td>0.048</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While no analysis is offered here, the events identified using the formula are:

1) January 2000, in the liberal press. This small, though significant increase in coverage about the Putsch, was caused by Yeltsin’s resignation on 31 December 1999. What followed was a period of reflection on Yeltsin’s presidency.

2) August 2001, the Communist press. A book about the Putsch, ‘Sinking into the Abyss’ [pogruzhenie v bezduh], was published in serial in Sovetskaia Rossiia throughout the month. This polemic, along with a number of reader reactions, explored the ‘provocative purpose of Gorbachev and Yeltsin’s actions during those [August] days’.

3) September 2006, the central press. The upsurge in interest in the August Putsch followed the launch of the concept ‘Sovereign democracy’, proposed by Zorkin on 22 August 2006.
4) **early 2008, prior to presidential election.** The liberal press printed a series of articles emphasising the role of the secret services, closely associated with Putin, and their role in the collapse of the USSR.

5) **August 2008, central press.** A false positive: both a film and an exhibition about the Putsch, along with attempts by Edinaia Rossiia to appropriate the ‘Day of the Russian Flag’, a holiday hitherto commemorated mainly by the democrats. Individually, though, none of these stories were widely reported.

6) **January 2011, liberal press.** Another false positive.

7) **February 2012, liberal press.** Extensive parallels drawn between the last days of the USSR and the ongoing anti-Putin protests. For the first time focus was as much on the popular protests of February 1990 as the Putsch itself.

Of the seven memory events above, two are false positives, by which I mean no single event was obviously the cause of increased attention. However, by inspecting the sources, it was easy to identify false positives, whereas it would be virtually impossible to find false negatives (I would have no idea where to look). In conclusion, I would draw attention to the memory events the formula was able to identify, and emphasise how relatively few events there were, indeed, the plot above, as well as the adjusted p-values, suggest that the events identified are marginal. At no point was there an event that all orientations deemed worthy of coverage. For every instance above the memory event is offset by an absence of the event in other newspapers, which illustrates the importance of media selection. The method proposed reduces researcher bias, in that the researcher will only look in places identified by the data. Additionally prior knowledge is less crucial for accurately identifying significant aspects. One big disadvantage, though, is that this method is unable to capture events that for some reason were overlooked, that found no resonance in any media.

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1 I will not describe the details of the ANOVA here. It is worth noting that these are not real predictions, in the sense of for the future, but rather an estimate of what each data point should be based on the weighting of variables deemed significant by the ANOVA.
The Sinister Side of Petr Stolypin

Mariëlle Wijermars

In the October 2012 issue of *East European Memory Studies*, Galina Rylkova discusses the rise of the memory of Petr Stolypin in contemporary Russian public discourse. Taking the 2008 *Name of Russia* competition in which Stolypin came second place as the point of departure for her discussion, Rylkova gives a convincing reading of the meaning ascribed to the pre-revolutionary prime minister and of how the image of the ‘great reformer’, whose death allegedly made the advent of war and revolution inevitable, has been linked directly to Vladimir Putin. In this article I want to highlight another, more sinister side to how the Stolypin memory has been interpreted in the public domain. Firstly, I want to draw attention to Stolypin’s most active advocates and to call into question the spontaneity of the Stolypin revival. There are strong grounds for doubting that Russian viewers *en masse* discovered their latent admiration for Stolypin in the second half of 2008. Secondly, I will discuss the *Name of Russia* episode on Stolypin in the light of two other TV programmes that were broadcast in 2006 and 2012 to demonstrate how the memory of Stolypin has been put to use as a means of discrediting the opposition in Russia.

In the political sphere, Stolypin has found his main advocate in none other than president Putin. As early as in his first Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation in 2000, Putin explicitly referred to the case of Stolypin as an illustration of the difficulty involved in striking a balance between the interests of the state and the individual.1 Later, as prime minister (2008-12), Putin actively quoted and paraphrased well-known statements by Stolypin on a number of occasions. For example, at the 2011 investment forum ‘Russia Calling!’, Putin made headlines in the Russian media when he adapted Stolypin’s famous catchphrase ‘They are in need of great upheavals, but we need a great Russia’. Putin’s version (‘We do not need great upheavals, we need a great Russia’) was aimed here at substantiating his claim that Russia was an ‘island of stability’ and a ‘safe haven’ for foreign investors.2 In the cultural sphere, Stolypin is championed by Nikita Mikhalkov, one of the most influential public figures today, and strongly supportive of the Kremlin. Mikhalkov’s efforts to popularize Stolypin can be traced back to long before the *Name of Russia*. As far back as 2001, Mikhalkov suggested placing a statue of Stolypin on Lubianka Square in Moscow to replace the highly disputed statue of Feliks Dzerzhinskii that was taken down in 1991.3 Since then, Mikhalkov has continued to throw his weight behind a series of projects aimed at presenting Stolypin as a role model for contemporary Russia, of which two will be discussed below.

Stolypin’s success in the 2008 *Name of Russia* contest might actually be connected to Mikhalkov’s involvement in the project. Nikolai Golev and Olga Yakovleva have argued that ‘the project results are not identification of the Russians’ real attitude to a historic character but their attitude towards the project and its participants’.4 Following their argument that viewers would be likely to vote for their
favourite among the representatives taking part in the project, votes for Stolypin should be interpreted not as an endorsement of Stolypin, or even of Putin as Ryilkova suggests, but as votes for Stolypin’s representative in the shows, Nikita Mikhalkov. Part of the votes cast may indeed be interpreted as indirect votes for Putin and Mikhalkov, but to explain Stolypin’s success we have to take into account the noticeable effort his proponents have made to create the appearance of popular support for the memory of Stolypin.

Polls executed by the Levada Center over a twenty-year period (1989-2008) indicate that Stolypin has in fact never been very popular. In these polls, respondents were asked to name five to ten outstanding individuals, without restriction on time period or nationality. In 1989 and 1991 less than one per cent named Stolypin. In 1994, the figure rose to eight per cent, before dropping back to one per cent in 1999, and finally rising to four per cent by 2008. Considering these numbers, it is surprising that Stolypin was elected as the second most popular Russian of all time and came before Stalin.

Many commentators have indeed claimed that the results of the popular voting were falsified. Liubov’ Borusikh has demonstrated how the leaders of the project not only tried to influence online voting in the first stages of the competition, but actually manipulated results (most notably, by declaring a large number of votes for Stalin invalid because they were cast by hackers), as well as selecting and shaping the memory of the eventual winner, Aleksandr Nevskii, to fit their desired vision of Russian identity. Regardless of whether Stolypin was in fact chosen or not, the outcome of the show creates the impression that he was. The symbolic meaning of Stolypin’s widely publicized election as the second greatest Russian of all time, and how this media event may in turn have influenced public perception of Stolypin as a role model, should not be underestimated.

Another attempt at maintaining the pretence of grassroots support for the rise of the Stolypin memory is connected to the official Stolypin-year that was celebrated in 2012. The most public act of commemoration was the erection of a statue of Stolypin in downtown Moscow next to the House of Government.

The statue was unveiled on 27 December 2012 by Putin and Medvedev, thus emphasizing the importance the regime attributes to the memory of Stolypin. The design was the outcome of a competition in which both established and young artists took part, and the selection procedure included a phase of popular voting. But what is more important, the statue was crowd funded. It was paid for through donations made by politicians (among whom, Putin himself), businessmen, and so-called ordinary Russians. In a news item on one of the state TV channels it was proudly announced that teachers and pensioners had donated half of their monthly income, and that donations were made from all regions of Russia, thereby emphasizing the claim that Stolypin is of importance to Russians from all layers of society and all regions.

What, then, are the ideological messages carried by these cultural representations and adaptations of the Stolypin memory? How do they function as a memory model for contemporary politics? To answer these questions, we can broaden the field to include, in addition to the Name of Russia (2008), two other TV programmes that indicate, both implicitly and explicitly, the relevance of Stolypin for the present. The first is a fictional TV-series from 2006, consisting of 14 episodes, with the title Stolypin…The Unlearned Lessons (Stolypin…Neyuchennye uroki).

Because of the clear entertainment value of the series it can be said to be aimed at introducing Stolypin to a wide audience, quite some time before the Name of Russia actually succeeded in attaining this goal. The second programme is the 2012 television documentary Stolypin: A Shot at Russia (Stolypin: Vystrel v Rossiiu).

All three productions are linked in several important ways, and can thus be considered as a discursive whole. Nikita Mikhalkov is connected to all three projects, both directly and indirectly. Mikhalkov both directed the 2012 documentary, and personally represented Stolypin in the Name of Russia competition (please see right hand image at top of next page). Mikhalkov himself does not appear to have involved in the 2006 TV series, but he hired the same actor that played Stolypin in the 2006 series to embody the
prime-minister in a number of re-enacted scenes in the 2012 documentary. The bio-clip used for the Name of Russia episode on Stolypin also used fragments from the 2006 TV series. There are **stylistic and thematic** correspondences as well, such as the visual metaphor of Stolypin constructing a scale model, symbolizing Russia, that is either left unfinished and forgotten or is destroyed after his death, that we find in both the Name of Russia biopic and the TV series.

The memory model of Stolypin that emerges from these three television projects has three central elements or motifs. The first is the valorisation of order and the strong state. Presented as a ‘social contract’ between state and society, an increased level of authoritarianism and suspension of civil rights is allowed for a particular period of time to restore order and implement top-down reforms for the overall benefit of the nation. In the exposition of this motif, Stolypin’s period in power is made analogous to Putin’s in two distinct ways. Firstly, it is emphasized that Stolypin restored political order following the 1905 revolution. Here we see direct similarities to the way Putin has presented himself, as the person who restored order and economic growth following the tragic 1990s. But the achieved level of stability is by no means permanent. The second aspect of the analogy warns about the possible consequences of removing Putin from power. Had Stolypin not been killed in 1911, so the argument goes, he would have continued implementing reforms and, as a result, Russia’s participation in the First World War and the 1917 revolutions would have been averted. Stolypin embodies this promise of long-term stability and economic prosperity, but also the risk that if visionary political rule is prematurely ended, everything will collapse and revolution and bloodshed will be unavoidable. In a similar vein, Putin asserts time and again that Russia has come a long way but is not yet out of the woods. If the set course is not continued, Russia will slip back into chaos. Stolypin’s famous quote ‘Give the state 20 years’ of peace and you will not recognize present-day Russia’ has obvious appeal for the current regime. The death of Stolypin and the subsequent slip into revolution and civil war is made analogous to the situation if Putin were to lose power.

The second recurring theme is a cult of heroic but selfless leadership. Through the figure of Stolypin, the notion is put forward that authority can be invested in a particular individual of unique disposition who is destined to lead the country out of chaos towards stability and prosperity. A similar personification of power we find with regard to Putin; the idea that there is no alternative, no other person capable and willing to dedicate themselves to guiding the nation. Last year, the NTV programme **Central Television** (Tsentr’noe Televidenie) followed Putin for a week and on his 60th birthday broadcast an hour long feature that invested Putin with many of the same personal traits that are attributed to Stolypin, showing him to be selfless, modest, hard-working, but strong enough to withstand opposition from multiple fronts. In one of the brief interviews included in the programme, Putin is explicitly asked about the possibility of transferring power. Putin replies
that he would be willing to hand over to the next generation, but that there were simply no capable candidates at the moment.

The third motif is the claim that this visionary leader is obstructed by domestic opposition. This, to me, is the most important but also the most dangerous aspect of the Stolypin memory since it constructs the opposition as an enemy of the state and, as a result, potentially justifies repressions. Members of the opposition are portrayed as materialists; selfish individuals who lack a real or viable vision for Russia, block the leadership’s attempts at constructive reform and steer towards a path that will result in bloody revolution. But, first and foremost, and this is also where direct parallels with the contemporary political discourse come to the fore, members of the opposition are depicted as ‘foreign agents’: receiving funds from abroad and spending a lot of time in the West. Moreover, it is intimated that they are willing to leave the country behind as soon as they get the chance, abandoning and betraying their motherland. In other words, all forms of opposition are equated with treason against the national cause.

This is also the aspect in which the Stolypin memory model differs from other historical images connected to the restoration of order following a period of political chaos, such as seeing Putin’s presidency as the end of a Time of Troubles. In the case of the Time of Troubles narrative, the enemy is foreign (for instance, ‘the Poles’). The way that the memory model of Stolypin has been used, on the other hand, places Russia’s enemies within Russian society itself. There are clear analogies here to the discursive strategies used to negatively depict the leaders of the Russian protest movement in the two documentaries NTV aired in 2012 under the name Anatomy of a Protest (Anatomia Protesta). For instance, the claim that Sergei Udaltsov received funding from Georgian state official Givi Targamadze, who allegedly also organized the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, to overthrow the current regime in Russia.

In the final scene in Mikhalkov’s 2012 documentary, Mikhalkov comes close to spelling out the contemporary political relevance of Stolypin’s legacy. In the scene, we see Mikhalkov standing in the Pecherskaia Lavra in Kiev where Stolypin is buried. He explains that, after Stolypin’s death, the Russian state collapsed and civil war ensued. Millions died and millions more fled into emigration, leaving everything behind. Mikhalkov asks rhetorically: ‘Did these people think about how terribly their lives would change, all because they failed to listen to the one person who knew what to do and was capable of stopping this destruction?’ He gives examples of politicians who challenged Stolypin, only to end by dying ‘in poverty’ in exile, far from Russia. After a long, meaningful pause, Mikhalkov continues:

But it was too late. And now, when we look back at that time, the feeling arises that, maybe, today we need to remember Stolypin more than ever before. It makes sense to remember this situation where everything was on the brink [of collapse] but could still be saved. [...] I believe it makes sense to think about this and especially for those, who dismally, ironically, spit upon their past, their present, without considering what the future might hold for them after that. It is time to learn how to learn [from the past].

The message here is unspoken, but clear: for Mikhailov, learning from the past means that, as Stolypin’s contemporary counterpart, Putin’s position in power should not be challenged.

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1 In the cited Levada study (2010), Stalin was mentioned by 36 per cent of respondents in 2008. The top five of 2008 was complemented by Pushkin (47%); Petr I (37%); Lenin (34%); and, Putin (32%).
This new project is about the explosion of the politics of memory triggered by the commemoration of fall of state socialism in Eastern Europe on its twentieth anniversary. It has been a relatively understudied topic in political science and our intent is to move the politics of memory into the mainstream of studies on post-communist politics and democratization. The project is founded on an important central premise. Remembering the past, particularly collectively, is always a political process, thus the politics of memory and commemoration needs to be studied as an integral part of the struggle between political actors to take and maintain power.

The project grew out of discussions of the twentieth anniversary of the 1989 Roundtable Accord in Poland. The commemoration of that event, generally understood as a momentous historical turning point in the history of the world, was a highly contested event whose significance was open to radically different interpretations, and became a central facet of the political struggle. Also, as anniversaries came across the former Soviet Bloc from 2009-11, it became clear that the view of the demise of communism in the region was different from the way it was imagined in the West. Given that there seemed to be less enthusiasm in the countries that experienced the original events, we decided that the commemoration of 1989 was important to study.

We propose an original theoretical framework that provides guidance for the study of the politics of memory across the cases covered in the book. There are three distinct components to this framework. First, we offer the idea of mnemonic actors. They are political forces that are interested in a specific interpretation of the past. They often treat history instrumentally in order to construct a vision of the past that they assume will generate the most effective legitimation for their efforts to gain and hold power. We identify and characterize four different kinds of actors: mnemonic warriors, pluralists, abnegators, and prospectives.

Second, we develop the idea of mnemonic regime, the dominant pattern of memory politics that exists in a given society at a given moment. The type of regime is dictated by the characteristics of the actors prevailing in the field of memory politics and the salience of the issues they are attempting to use to their advantage. We identify three different types of memory regimes: fractured, pillarized, and unified.

The third and final component of our framework is theoretical. We explore how several different configurations of factors affect the emergence of mnemonic actors and different varieties of memory regimes. After a careful analysis of our cases, we determined that the dependent variable of this study should be the political form of the memory regime that is defined as a configuration of strategic choices and has three values: memory regimes identified above. There are three groups of causal factors that influence the political form of the memory regime in our study: (1) the range of structural constrains the actors face in the post-1989/91 political environments (most of them related to the type of regime transformation typical for a given country), (2) several cultural constraints related to “past” of a specific actor or the existence and salience of specific cleavages in a given country (for example, ethnic), and (3) a set of cultural (as distinct from strategic) choices that actors can make, such as the choice of post-communist political identity or the choice to engage in mnemonic contests revolving around other past events (in our terminology -- mnemonic layering).

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Introduction; Uilleam Blacker and Alexander Etkind

PART I: DIVIDED MEMORY
1. Europe's Divided Memory; Aleida Assmann
2. Human Rights and European Remembrance; Jay Winter
3. European Memory: Between Jewish and Cosmopolitan; Natan Sznaider

PART II: POST-COLONIAL, POST-SOCIALIST
4. Between Paris and Warsaw; Multidirectional Memory, Ethics and Historical Responsibility; Michael Rothberg
5. Theory as Memory Practice: The Divided Discourse on Poland's Postcoloniality; Dirk Uffelmann
6. Occupation vs Colonization: Post-Soviet Latvia and the Provincialization of Europe; Kevin M. F. Platt

PART III: MOURNING MATTERS
7. Murder in the Cemetery: Memorial Clashes over the Victims of the Soviet-Polish Wars; Andrzej Nowak
8. Living among the Ghosts of Others: Urban Postmemory in Eastern Europe; Uilleam Blacker
9. Towards Cosmopolitan Mourning; Belarusian Literature between History and Politics; Simon Lewis

PART IV: MEMORY WARS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
10. Why Digital Memory Studies Should Not Overlook Eastern Europe's Memory Wars; Ellen Rutten
11. Memory Wars in Post-Soviet Ukraine (1991-2010); Andriy Portnov
12. The Struggle for History: The Past as a Limited Resource; Ilya Kalinin

In the last decades of the twentieth century, a 'memory boom' took place in Western Europe and North America. It is the aim of this volume to investigate how academic practices of Memory Studies are being applied, adapted, and transformed in the countries of East-Central Europe and the former Soviet Union. Importing the 'memory boom' into a new cultural context without interrogating the paradigm itself is of course impossible, and this has been the starting point for the current volume. While for scholars of Eastern Europe the volume will be interesting for the specifics discussed in each chapter, for scholars in Memory Studies it affords a new, startlingly different perspective on a paradigm that has become canonical and crystallized.
Soviet War Memorials and Victory Day / Памятник и праздники Project

This research project examines the celebration of 8 and 9 May and the interaction between Soviet war memorials and local communities throughout the former Soviet sphere of influence. It is structured as an interdisciplinary research network that involves sociologists, historians, political scientists and photographers, all of whom have expertise and a long-standing interest in the commemoration of the Second World War in general and Soviet war memorials in particular, as well as specialist knowledge of individual regions. On and around 8 and 9 May 2013, approximately 50 project participants (including student assistants) were involved in a pilot study that has produced interviews, photos, field notes, and maps of ceremonies and festivities in Berlin, Grozny, Kharkiv, Kutaisi, Minsk, Moscow, Nizhniy Novgorod, Riga, Rostov-on-Don, Saint Petersburg, Sochi, Sofia, Sortavala, Tallinn, Thilisi, Tiraspol, Tula, Tver, Vienna and Vilnius. The purpose of this pilot project was to gather a large amount of data following a shared set of guidelines, enabling for the first time a transnational comparative study of the local political, emotional, and spatial significance of Soviet war memorials and Victory Day celebrations for local communities across different cities and countries. Results will be published in the form of an edited volume containing both local case studies and a number of comparative pieces. The hope is to find follow-up funding for a larger and more systematic study in the anniversary year of 2015. (The first stage of the project received support from Memorial Moscow and the French-Russian Center for the Humanities and Social Sciences.)

The project is co-ordinated by Mischa Gabowitsch at the Einstein Forum in Potsdam, Germany (who is working on a Collective Biography of Soviet War Memorials with funding from the Hamburg Foundation for Science and Culture) and Elena Nikiforova at the Centre for Independent Social Research in Saint Petersburg, who is working on a project titled ‘The Cultural Politics of Memory in the Estonian-Russian Border Zone’.

A podcast interview in Russian with Mischa Gabowitsch on the history of Soviet war memorials and the project is available at:

http://www.svoboda.org/content/article/24935095.html

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